TraceTogether (TT) is Singapore’s mass contact tracing effort in the midst of a pandemic. Residents are issued a token or can download an app on their phone which exchanges Bluetooth signals with nearby devices. This is a secure way to keep track of contacts in the case that COVID exposure is suspected, yet at the same time provide the privacy required as it does not store GPS locations. There is no escaping from TT since it is the main and sometimes only tool one can use to enter shopping malls, work places and places of worship.
I want to start by first saying that I DO NOT think that the government meant for TT data be used as a mass surveillance program on its citizens or residents.
Over the past few days, it has come to light that TT data can be used by law enforcement in criminal investigations. While I am all for law enforcement to investigate using information that can be made available, I do not believe that TT data is one of them. The government should not be the custodian of our data without presenting an option for our data not to be shared.
As of writing, Minister Balakrishnan have came out with a statement and have apologised in parliament over not being transparent about the use of TraceTogether (TT) data for criminal investigations. You can read his statement here. While I accept that an apology is made and the terms are now clearly mentioned, this episode is, the second time (the first time will be a story for another time) I am disappointed with how the government is dishonest with Singaporeans and thinking we are fools.
What troubles me is… why undermine the efficacy of TT as a HEALTH security app? The purpose of TT is to ensure we keep COVID manageable through efficient yet non-intrusive contact tracing methods. If uptake of TT is a concern and the government wants residents to be supportive of this efficient contact tracing program, then the last thing you want to be is deceitful over how the data is used.
Sure, you might say that maybe it was never the intention to use TT data for criminal investigations at the beginning and therefore marketed as ONLY for contact tracing purposes. Then why the change of terms of use? Again, back to the main issue at hand, why undermine the efficacy of TT as a health security app? How does mistrust in possibly Singapore’s first line of detection of community spread of a deadly virus help the government’s case here?
If TT data was intended from the beginning to be used for criminal investigations but not mentioned previously, then it appears to me that this was deliberately planned. In an age where data is king, there is no way that no one in the government or along the chain of command thought that it was necessary to make this known to us all. It’s sad that the custodians of our data are also the ones making the rules of how our data can be used here. Who is setting the boundaries? And how are we so sure that this exception will not be further extended in the future, not necessarily with TT data. The government? The government’s words are no longer credible.
COVID will be gone one day and all of us will delete the app or return our token. But if a pandemic were to ever hit us again, does the government not realise that uptake will be sluggish and there might be resistance because of this breach of trust and lack of transparency? This is a life and death matter. People at the top need to realise that solving crimes, yes, are important, but our law enforcement agencies are not so crippled to the point where it needs to stoop to using health data. This trust, now broken, is hard to repair.
Don’t undermine the purpose of TT because by doing so, you (as the government) are also undermining the trust that citizens have placed in you.
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